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IV

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs make several arguments urging this Court to answer the Certified
Questions in the affirmative. Defendant addresses most of them in the Opening Brief of
Appellant ("Defendant's Brief). In this brief, it provides the following additional
responses to points raised in Plaintiffs' Brief:
(a)

Plaintiffs' discussion of Utah case law on the public policy cause of

action, Section 1(A), reinforces the fact that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act
"UWCA" is a comprehensive scheme that this Court should not effectively change
through job guarantees and new rights of action.
(b)

Plaintiffs' "doomsday" prediction of what will happen if this Court

fails to recognize a public policy cause of action consists of sheer speculation; moreover,
it is undermined by their own statutory analysis which shows that adequate checks on
Utah employers already exist.
(c)

As set forth in Defendant's Brief and updated in this brief, Plaintiffs'

state-by-state analysis, Section 1(B), is inaccurate and misleading.
(d)

Plaintiffs' attempt to add an internal opposition cause of action,

Section 11(A), is not supported by the cases they cite and, as applied to the allegations of
the Complaint, would go beyond both common and statutory law that have extended
protections to employees who oppose unlawful treatment of other employees.
(e)

Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, Utah common law does not support

extending the public policy cause of action to claims of constructive discharge; Utah
should follow jurisdictions that have been unwilling to expand the claim to cases where
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an employee resigns but alleges he reasonably believed conditions of employment to be
intolerable.
(f)

Plaintiffs offer no support for their most ambitious application of the

public policy doctrine to claims of harassment and discrimination short of discharge; to
Defendant's knowledge, no such support exists and Plaintiffs' position has consistently
been rejected.
II.
A.

THE COURT SHOULD ANSWER "NO" TO THE FIRST CERTIFIED
QUESTION
Plaintiffs' Arguments Regarding The Importance And
Comprehensiveness Of The UWCA Do Not Support Recognizing A
Common Law Wrongful Discharge Cause Of Action
Plaintiffs emphasize the importance and comprehensiveness of the

UWCA's statutory scheme. They quote and emphasize this Court's description of the
Act as "a comprehensive scheme enacted to provide speedy compensation to workers
who are injured as a result of an accident occurring in the course and scope of their
employment." Sheppickv. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1996) (quoted at
p.5 of Plaintiffs' Brief). Plaintiffs go on to note the UWCA's exclusive remedy
provision, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-105(1), which makes the right to recover
compensation for injuries the "exclusive remedy against the employer," which "shall be
in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law and otherwise, to
the employee." Plaintiffs' Brief, p.5.
Plaintiffs fail to explain why if the Legislature created an "exclusive and
comprehensive" statutory scheme, and expressly limited employee rights of recovery
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against employers, that an additional cause of action is necessary to preserve the "entire
purpose" of this "whole regulatory scheme." Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 6. 1 he\ oliei no
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workers "in a worse position than they were prior to the enactment o f the U W e A.
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in by the continued legislative silence v i en die Legislature could easily remedy such a
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work-related injury has remained the same before and after the enactment of the UWCA;
employees are no better or worse off in this respect.1
Plaintiffs cite various criminal penalties to which employers are subject if
they evade their UWCA obligations, Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 6, n. 4. These provisions, along
with some others within and without the UWCA help explain the baselessness of
Plaintiffs' fear that the Act will be destroyed without an anti-retaliation cause of action.
As the provisions they cite demonstrate, there are real legal sanctions for employers that
do not take their UWCA obligations seriously. See UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-2-407
(employers must promptly report all work-related injuries to the Division of Industrial
Actions); §34A-2-405 (injured workers must be compensated whether or not they
continue to be employed); §34A-2-301 (an employer may not "maintain any place of
employment that is not safe"). Plaintiffs note that Defendant is self-funded, as allowed
by UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-2-201.5. Plaintiffs' Brief, p. xvi. However, as can be seen
in that detailed statutory section, self-insurers come under especially close regulatory

1

Plaintiffs' worse-than-before-UWCA argument fails to take into account
that prior to the UWCA, employees had to overcome almost insurmountable obstacles
before they could obtain any remedy from an employer for an on-the-job injury. They
not only had to prove that the employer was negligent but had to overcome the "unholy
trinity" of common law defenses: fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk, and
contributory negligence. See Lukic v. Southern Pacific Co., 160 F. 135 (1908) (directing
verdict for employer because the railroad laborer's injury was caused by the negligence
of a fellow servant brakeman).
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Af\Qf\n (\r\r\n~ic\in «. i

A

scrutiny and face costly consequences if regulators believe they are not properly
discharging their UWCA obligations.
Plaintiffs' notion that absent a common law anti-retaliation cause of action,
employers have an "unfettered" right to terminate injured workers also overlooks
available federal remedies. Employers of fifty or more employees, such as Defendant,
who allegedly make it a practice of firing injured workers would be subject to the
remedies and relief provided by the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.,
which guarantees qualified employees up to a twelve-week leave of absence while being
kept on the employer's health care plan. Under the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C § 12131 et seq., workers whose injuries constitute an impairment
"that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" would be entitled to a
reasonable accommodation allowing them to continue in their present job or, if this is not
possible, transfer to a vacant job they can perform with or without a reasonable
accommodation. An employer's failure to follow its ADA obligations, or any retaliation
against an employee with a disability, would subject it to statutory remedies including
reinstatement, back pay, attorneys1 fees and compensatory and punitive damages. 42
USCS § 12205 (providing for attorney fees); 42 USCS § 12117(a) (2005) (incorporating
Title VII remedies); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (providing for compensatory and punitive
damages); 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-5(G) (providing for various remedies, including
reinstatement and backpay). Indeed, all of the named Plaintiffs have filed administrative
claims against Defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") and the Antidiscrimination and Labor Division of the Labor Commission of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah. One Plaintiff, Felix Barela, filed a lawsuit under the ADA against Defendant in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Barela v. La-Z-Boy Corporation, Case
No. 1:03CV0032.
The sense of urgency Plaintiffs attempt to generate simply does not exist.
If the purposes of the UWCA might be enhanced or better effectuated with some form of
anti-retaliation cause of action, the Legislature can spend the time and give the requisite
attention to whether this is so and what the parameters of such action might be in order to
balance properly the following "competing legitimate interests:" "The interests of the
employer to regulate the environment to promote productivity, security, and similar
lawful business objectives, and the interests of the employees to maximize access to their
statutory and Constitutional rights within the workplace." Hansen v. America Online,
Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 953 (Utah 2004).
B.

Plaintiffs' Multi-State Analysis Is Flawed
Both parties have analyzed cases and legislation from other jurisdictions in

an attempt to persuade the Court to accept their positions.2 Plaintiffs' analysis, however,

2

Defendant has made three corrections to its own multi-state analysis that
affect Exhibit B (which catalogues the states in which courts did not create a cause of
action in the absence of an anti-retaliation or interference statute) and Exhibit C (which
catalogues the states in which courts created a cause of action based on the general
policies in the workers' compensation statute).
The state of Delaware has moved from Exhibit B, Category (1), to
Exhibit B, Category (2), because the Delaware legislature did enact an anti-retaliation
statute in 1997, 19 Del. C. § 2365, after the court in Emory v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc.,
1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1063 (Del. 1985) had refused to create such a cause of action in
[Footnote continued on next page]
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is flawed. The critical question is not how many states have created a wrongful discharge
cause of action based on the exercise of workers' compensation rights, but how they did
it. Of the 43 states that did create such a cause of action, 32 have relied on their
legislatures to provide a specific basis for the cause of action, rather than have their
courts create it based on the general policies in their workers' compensation statutes.
While some of those legislatures enacted more specific statutes than others, all of them
[Continuedfromprevious page]

the absence of such a statute. See Amended Exhibit B, attached to the Addendum of this
Reply Memorandum.
The state of Arkansas has moved from Exhibit C to Exhibit B, because the
court in Wal-Mart v. Pam Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239; 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991) recognized
the existence of a retaliatory discharge cause of action based on a statute in the Workers'
Compensation Act that provided a criminal penalty for any employer who "willfully
discriminates" against "any individual on account of his claiming benefits. Although the
Arkansas legislature later chastised the court for usurping its function by expanding the
penalty for a violation to include civil remedies, Tackett v. Crain Automotive d/h/a Car
Pro, 321 Ark. 36; 899 S.W.2d 839 (1995), that makes the contrast with Utah even more
compelling. Unlike Utah there is no statute whatsoever that prohibits an employer from
terminating the employment of an employee who has filed a workers' compensation
claim.
The state of Kentucky has moved from Exhibit B to Exhibit C, because the
court in Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky 1983), had created a
wrongful discharge cause of action despite the absence of any provisions specifically
restricting an employer from discharging an employee for the exercise of rights under the
workers' compensation statutes. But see id. at 733 ("The statement that the Workers'
Compensation Act was violated is pure sophistry
The majority opinion is not
based on reason, it is simply an expression of distaste for discharge of an employee for
filing a claim of workers' compensation . . . . Violation of a right 'implicit' in a statute is
so vague as to cover about any situation the majority determines in its wisdom is contrary
to standards of justice.") (J. Stephenson, dissenting). Later, in 1987, the Kentucky
legislature enacted KRS § 342.197, which prohibits discrimination against any employee
who has filed and pursues a lawful workers' compensation claim. See Amended Exhibits
B and C, attached to the Addendum of this Reply Memorandum.

4090/2 00072037 v 1
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gave their courts an express statutory hook on which to hang a wrongful discharge cause
of action. The Utah legislature has not.
Although Plaintiffs assert that there are 25 states in which courts have
recognized such a wrongful discharge cause of action, even without a specific statutory
prohibition, that statement is incorrect. Only 11 states have done so (Amended
Exhibit C). Plaintiffs have simply misclassified numerous cases. For example, in
Sorenson v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70 (Id. 1990), there was no workers' compensation
retaliation claim at issue. On the contrary, the issue was whether the court should apply
the public policy exception to the at-will rule in situations where an employee is
terminated for his religious beliefs or his efforts to negotiate employment conditions in
good faith. The court decided "no." In Judson v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board, 586 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1978), the court was enforcing CAL. LABOR CODE§ 132a
(prohibiting workers' compensation retaliation), which the California legislature had
enacted in 1972. In Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1990),
the court was enforcing the same statutory "other device" language that formed the basis
for the wrongful discharge cause of action in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260
Ind. 249, 297 N.E. 2d 425 (1973). The list goes on. Cf. Plaintiffs Brief, Section B, and
Defendant's Amended Exhibits B and C, attached to the Addendum of this Reply
Memorandum.
The fact that Plaintiffs have misclassified so many states that have relied on
their legislatures to create a statutory basis for the cause of action underscores the
weakness of their claim in Utah, which lacks any such statutory basis. It is also

4090/2 00072037 v 1
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significant that out of the 11 states in which courts have created such a tort based on the
"general policies" existing in the penumbras of the workers' compensation statute, rather
than on a specific statutory provision, legislatures in five of those states later intervened
to enact legislation (Arizona, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, and North Dakota). At
least one legislature "took express exception to the court's indication that it rather than
the legislature had the authority to define public policy." Galati v. America West
Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290; 69 P.3d 1011 (2003). Another legislature made it clear that
its "avowed purpose was to overrule our decisions" where the courts created retaliatory
discharge tort based on a criminal statute. Tackett v. Grain Automotive d/b/a Car Pro,
321 Ark. 36, 38; 899 S.W.2d 839, 840 (1995).
In most states, courts and legislatures alike have recognized, sometimes
explicitly, that it is not appropriate for courts to attempt to correct perceived legislative
omissions by creating causes of action based on the "general policies" of their workers'
compensation law, despite the absence of any specific statutory basis for it. The same
fundamental principles that animated those decisions apply in Utah. As Utah's State
Constitution makes clear, it is not the function of courts to correct perceived defects and
omissions in legislation, or to "protect" perceived policies in legislative enactments by
usurping the legislative function. Article V, Section 1 states: "The powers of the
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or

4090/2 00072037 v1
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permitted." Article VIII, Section 22 provides that if the Supreme Court discerns "any
seeming defect or omission in the law," it shall report it in writing to the Governor. Thus,
even if this Court considered the 88-year absence of such a cause of action to be a
legislative omission or policy oversight, it would not be the function of the Court to
create a cause of action, but at most to advise the Governor or the Legislature of any
concerns. The Court should follow those states that have relied on their legislatures to
provide a specific statutory basis for a workers' compensation retaliation claim before
recognizing such a cause of action.
III.

THE COURT SHOULD ANSWER "NO" TO THE SUBPARTS OF THE
SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION
If the Court answers the First Certified Question in the negative, as it

should, the Court need not address the three subparts of the Second Certified Question.
Indeed, the need to address such detailed, policy-making subparts underscores why the
Court should answer "no" to the First Certified Question. Nevertheless, to the extent that
the Court sees fit to explore the various potential parameters of a retaliation claim, it
should answer the subparts of the Second Certified Question in the negative.
A.

There Is No Basis To Add An Internal Opposition Claim To The
Retaliatory Discharge Tort
In Plaintiffs' Brief, they make no attempt to fit the allegations of their

Complaint regarding Ms. Touchard to any of the four categories of public policy
wrongful discharge listed by this Court in Hansen, at 952. Moreover, they make no
attempt to fit the allegations of the Complaint to the framework of Utah public policy
case law developed over the past decade and a half. They cite no Utah cases, and the

4090/2 00072037 v 1
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cases cited from other jurisdictions do not help them since they all involve statutory
construction or interpretation as opposed to judge-made common law exceptions to
at-will employment. See Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 125 S.Ct. 1497,
1504-05 (2005) (retaliation for internal complaint of sex discrimination included within
"broad" statutory provision of Title IX prohibiting "discrimination" on the basis of sex).
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1969) (both white lessor and
African-American lessee protected by 42 U.S.C. §1982, which grants parties, regardless
of race, the right to lease real and personal property). Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc.,
859 F.2d 1439, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1988) (white manager who was fired after refusing to
discharge an African-American employee and after he stated his intention to support the
employee's EEOC claim protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which preserves the rights of
parties to make and enforce contracts without regard to race); Wilkerson v. Standard
Knitting Mills, Inc., 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 666, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 56,274 (1989)
(employer's order to company nurse to help evade its statutory obligations constituted a
"device" under the Tennessee Workers Compensation Statute, TCA § 50-6-114, which
prohibits any "device" which might operate to relieve employers of their obligations
"created by this chapter").
Contrast these statutory interpretation cases with the common law cases
cited in Defendant's Brief pp. 32-33, and with another case refusing to extend the
common law cause of action to non-injured employees who assist others in filing for
workers' compensation: Taylor v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29533
(9 Cir. 1998) (although Nevada has adopted the public policy wrongful discharge claim

AOQOP 00072037 v 1
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for employees fired in retaliation for seeking worker's compensation benefits, it would
not extend it "to protect personnel employees whose duty it is to assist co-workers in
processing [worker's compensation] claims," and noting that Nevada courts have
required more than a "mere objection" to employer policies but an actual "refusal to
comply with an employer's demand" that the employee engage in improper or unlawful
behavior.)
In Plaintiffs' Brief, they note that Ms. Touchard worked as "the
Environmental/Assistant Safety Manager," that "[o]ne of Ms. Touchard's
responsibilities" related to investigating Defendant's workers' compensation costs, which
led her to write the memorandum she attaches to the Complaint, and that "[a]s part of her
job duties," she led an ergonomics team, which led her to criticize some of the company's
safety policies and practices. Plaintiffs' Brief, p. xxxiii. They assert that despite her
efforts to "compel" or "push" her employer to follow her recommendations, it would not
do so and instead turned on her. Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 14-15.
Extending the public policy cause of action to these circumstances would
go beyond even what courts have allowed when applying statutes that expressly create
anti-retaliation causes of action. In McKenzie v. Renberg's, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10 Cir.
1996), a personnel director, whose responsibilities included monitoring compliance with
wage and hour laws, complained to the company attorney and president that a problem
existed with complying with the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The employer fired
her shortly thereafter. Despite the fact that the FLSA has an express cause of action
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based on employer retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), the court dismissed her complaint
because she never stepped outside of her role as personnel director:
"Here, McKenzie never crossed the line from being an employee merely
performing her job as Personnel Director to an employee lodging a personal
complaint against the wage and hour practices of her employer and
asserting a right adverse to the company. McKenzie did not initiate a
FLSA claim against the company on her own behalf or on behalf of anyone
else. Rather, in her capacity as personnel manager, she informed the
company that it was at risk of claims that might be instituted by others as a
result of its alleged FLSA violations. In order to engage in protected
activity under Section 215(a)(3), the employee must step outside his or her
role of representing the company and either file (or threaten to file) an
action adverse to the employer, actively assist other employees in asserting
FLSA rights, or otherwise engage in activities that reasonably could be
perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the FLSA.
Here, McKenzie did none of these things.... McKenzie's actions in
connection with the overtime pay issue were completely consistent with her
duties as Personnel Director for the company." Id. at 1486-1487.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion: e.g., Claudio-Gotay v.
Becton Dickinson Caribe, LTD., 375 F.3d 99, 102 (1 st Cir. 2004) ("when [plaintiff] first
informed Becton of the potential overtime violations, he did so in furtherance of his job
responsibilities"); Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 341 F. Supp, 2d 759, 763 (W.D. MI
2004) ("Plaintiffs' expressions of concern, even if characterized as 'complaints,' were
made in her capacity as Personnel Training Coordinator"); Smith v. Language Analysis
Systems, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 375, 378 (1997) ("nothing [plaintiff] did extended beyond the
scope of her position as Director of Human Resources.") Cf. EEOC v. HBE Corp., 153 F.
3d 543 554 (8 Cir. 1998) (approving the principle enunciated in McKenzie but
distinguishing the case based on the fact that plaintiff "refused to implement a
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discriminatory company policy" by firing an African-American; this refusal "placed him
outside the normal managerial role.")
B.

Constructive Discharge Would Unduly Expand The Scope Of The
Public Policy Cause Of Action
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion in their brief, p. 18, this Court has neither

explicitly nor implicitly recognized that constructive discharge is legally equivalent to an
actual discharge. The parties could possibly have raised the issue in Bihlmaier v. Carson,
603 P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979), or Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P. 2d 828 (Utah 1992).
However, they did not.
Defendant acknowledges that courts in Washington and Nevada have
extended the public policy cause of action to claims of constructive discharge. However,
it believes the more conservative approach enunciated by courts in Illinois and discussed
in Defendants9 Brief, p. 33-34, would be more consistent with this Court's approach to
applying and potentially expanding the public policy cause of action.
In addition, Defendant believes that if this Court were to extend the cause
of action to claims of constructive discharge, in keeping with its conservative approach, it
should not adopt the more expansive definition enunciated in Pennsylvania State Police
v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004), as Plaintiffs suggest. Suders construed Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was not addressing the more nuanced question of making
judicial exceptions to at-will employment. The standard adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court: "Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the
employee's position would have felt compelled to resign?" Id. at 141, subjects employers
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and the courts to myriad cases in which an employee quits but then asks a judge or jury to
agree that his resignation was "reasonable" in light of how bad working conditions were.
This open-ended standard could upset the balance of employer-employee interests this
Court noted in Hansen, 96 P. 3d at 953.
Instead, the standard should be as described by Justice Thomas in his
dissent in Suders, which tracked jurisprudence under the National Labor Relations Act
and early cases under Title VII. Under this standard of constructive discharge, an
employee would be required to show that the employer specifically intended to make him
or her quit by deliberately rendering their working conditions intolerable, and thus
effectively acting with the same purpose and effect as an actual discharge. 542 U.S. at
152-154. See also Korslundv. Duincorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 121 Wn. App. 295,
88 P.3d 966 (Wash. App. 2004), cited by Plaintiffs, which allows the constructive
discharge claim, but requires "a plaintiff to prove that an employer deliberately rendered
working conditions intolerable and thus forced the employee to permanently 'leave' the
employment." 88 P.3d at 976.
C.

Plaintiffs Provide No Basis To Extend The Cause Of Action Beyond
Discharge
Plaintiffs cite no authority extending the public policy cause of action

beyond discharge, whether constructive or actual, and Defendant is aware of none.
Rather, to Defendant's knowledge, when faced with the question, no court has been
willing to extend the common law at-will exception to demotions, transfers, wage
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reductions, mean-spiritedness, or any other allegedly retaliatory actions that stop short of
discharge.3
Plaintiffs make an impassioned policy argument for such an extension at
pages 20-21 of their brief. Defendant does not share their speculative assumptions; nor
does it agree with the "logic" of morphing the constructive discharge standard into a
standard applicable to employees who remain employed (which might be characterized as
an "intolerable - but tolerated" standard). In any event, if there is any merit to such an
argument, it ought to be directed to the Utah Legislature which can weigh the multitude
of potential variations of such a claim while seeking to preserve the balance described in
Hansen.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, La-Z-Boy respectfully requests that this Court
answer "no" to the certified questions from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Utah. The Court should rely on the Legislature to define the public policy of the State,
and to determine what causes of action and remedies, if any, are needed to protect the
rights and policies in the Workers' Compensation Act. The Legislature has amended the
Act numerous times in its 88-year history when it discerned a need to do so. It has
fulfilled its constitutionally delegated function. The continued legislative silence

3

Defendant notes that even the Washington case cited by Plaintiffs joins
others in rejecting the cause of action sought by Plaintiffs in this last Certified Question:
"This tort applies only when an employee has been discharged." Korslund, 88 P.3d at
975.
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regarding an anti-retaliation cause of action should not be disturbed by this Court. The
decision of whether, when, under what circumstances and with what remedies such a
cause should be created should be left to that elected body.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j?fi(iay of January, 2006.
BULLARD SMITH JERNSTEDT WILSON

By
Jathan Janove, USB No. 3722
Attorneys for Appellant
La-Z-Boy Incorporated
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AMENDED EXHIBIT B
IN 36 STATES, COURTS DID NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE
ABSENCE OF AN ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE STATUTE
1.

IN 4 STATES, COURTS EXPRESSLY REFUSED TO CREATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE LEGISLATURE HAS CONTINUED
NOT TO ENACT AN ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE
STATUTE

Georgia

Evans v. Bibb Company, 178 Ga. App. 139; 342 S.E.2d 484 (1986)
("Courts may interpret laws, but may not change them").

Mississippi

J.C Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Company, 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss.
1981) ("[t]he merits of his arguments are clearly for the Legislature to
assess, not the judiciary. Our Workmen's Compensation Law does not
contain a provision making it a crime for an employer to discharge an
employee for filing a claim").

Rhode
Island

Pacheco v. Raytheon Company, 623 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993) ("It is not the
role of the courts to create rights for persons whom the Legislature has not
chosen to protect").

Wisconsin

Brown v. Pick'N Save Food Stores, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (Wis. 2001)
("[T]he Wisconsin legislature created forfeiture as the only remedy in this
situation, and in 1975 it created a cause of action for a related kind of
discrimination but not for this kind of discrimination").

2.

IN 7 STATES, COURTS EXPRESSLY REFUSED TO CREATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION, BUT THE LEGISLATURE HAS SINCE
CREATED A CAUSE OF ACTION BY ENACTING AN ANTIRETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE STATUTE

Alabama
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Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814, 815 (Ala. 1984)
("Why then should we not leave it to the legislature to change the rule in
this case, where the employee was discharged allegedly for seeking
workmen's compensation benefits, a legislatively created right?"),
superseded by statute, ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (prohibiting termination,
as recognized in Twilley v. Dauber & Coated Prods., Inc., 536 So. 2d
1364 (Ala. 1988).
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Delaware

Emory v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., 1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1063 (Del.
1985) ("In Delaware, it is for the General Assembly, not the judiciary,
to declare the public policy of the state") superseded by statute, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 2365 (prohibiting discharge, retaliation or
discrimination).

Florida

Segal v. Arrow Industries Corporation, 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1978)
("There is no statute for retaliatory discharge. The court declines to
follow the reasoning of cases such as Frampton, superseded by FLA.
STAT. § 440.205 (prohibiting discharge, threatening discharge,
intimidation or coercion).

Missouri

Christy v. Paul Petrus, d/b/a South Side Auto Parts, 365 Mo. 1187; 295
S.W.2d 122 (1956) ("We can hardly conceive of the legislature making
such careful provision for the rights and compensation of injured
employees covered by the Act and yet omitting a specific provision for
recovery of damages for wrongful discharge if there had been any intent
to create such a right") superseded by statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.780
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination in any way) as recognized in
Kratzer v. Polar Custom Trailers, Inc., et al, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16981 (Mo. 2003).

New York

N. Y. WORKERS3 COMP. LAW § 120 (prohibiting discharge or
discrimination in any manner), as recognized in {Axel v. Duffy-Mott
Company Inc., Al N.Y.2d 1; 389 N.E.2d 1075 (1979) ("This relatively
recently enacted statute forbids employers to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against employees who claim compensation for job-related
injuries or who testify in proceedings to enforce such payment"); cf.
Murphy v. American Home Products Corporation, 58 N.Y.2d 293; 448
N.E.2d 86 (1983) ("This court has not and does not now recognize a
cause of action in tort for abusive or wrongful discharge of an
employee; such recognition must await action of the Legislature").

North Carolina Dockery v. Lampart Table Company and U.S. Furniture Industries, 36
N.C. App. 293; 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978) ("If the General Assembly of
North Carolina had intended a cause of action be created, surely, in a
workmen's compensation statute as comprehensive as ours, it would
have specifically addressed the problem."), superseded by statute, N.C
GEN. STAT § 95-241 (prohibiting discrimination or retaliatory action), as
recognized in Abels v. Renfro Corporation, 335 N.C. 209; 436 S.E.2d
822(1993).
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South Carolina Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536; 59 S.E.2d 148
(1950) (dismissing complaint because a retaliatory discharge for filing a
worker's compensation claim fails to state a claim), superseded by
statute, S.C. CODE ANN. §41-1-80, as recognized in Hinton v. Designer
Ensembles, Inc., 343 S.C. 236; 540 S.E.2d 94 (2000) (prohibiting
discharge or demotion).
3.

IN 25 STATES, LEGISLATURES FILLED SILENCE BY
ENACTING ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE
STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL RULE

Alaska

Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427 (Alas. 2004) (allowing a
cause of action based on ALASKA STAT. § 23.30-247, which prohibits
discrimination in hiring, "promotion, or retention policies or practices").

Arkansas

Wal-Mart v. Pam Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239; 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991)
(recognizing cause of action based on a criminal statute that expressly
prohibited any employer from willfully discriminating against "any
individual on account of his claiming benefits"), amended and
superseded by ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (prohibits discrimination in
regard to hiring or employment and provides penalties as determined by
the Workers' Compensation Commission; specifically annulling WalMart) as recognized by Tackett v. Crain Automotive d/b/a Car Pro, 321
Ark. 36; 899 S.W.2d 839 (1995) ("There is no doubt that the
legislature's intent in the passage of Act 796 of 1993 [amending Ark.
Code Ann. § 11-9-107] in fact its avowed purpose was to overrule our
decisions [in three cases, including Wal-Mart], where we" created
retaliatory discharge tort based on the criminal statute) (J. Corbin
dissenting opinion).

California

Portillo v. G. T. Price Productions, Inc., etal, 131 Cal. App. 3d 285;
182 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1982) (allowing a cause of action based on CAL.
LABOR CODE§ 132a, which prohibits discharge, threatening to discharge
or discrimination in any manner).

Connecticut

Baldracchiv. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, United Technologies
Corporation, 814 F.2d 102 (1987) (allowing a cause of action based on
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-290a, which prohibits discharge or
discriminating in any manner).

4090/2 00069517v 3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hawaii

Takakiv. Allied Machinery Corporation, etaL, 87 Haw. 57; 951 P.2d
507 (1998) (allowing a cause of action based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 37832 which prohibits discharge and discrimination based "solely" the
employee suffering a work injury).

Indiana

Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, 260 Ind. 249; 297 N.E.2d
425 (1973) ("We believe the threat of discharge to be a 'device5 within
the framework of 22-3-2-15") (allowing a cause of action based on IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15, which provides that "No contract or agreement,
written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall, in any
manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any
obligation created by this act").

Iowa

Springer v. Weeks and Leo Company, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558 (1988)
(allowing a cause of action based on low A CODE§ 85.18, which
provides that "No contract, rule, or device whatsoever shall operate to
relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by
this chapter except as herein provided").

Louisiana

Robin v. Raoul i(Skip " Galan, Clerk of the Court of Jefferson Parish,
545 So. 2d 1129 (La. 1989) (allowing a cause of action based on LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361, which prohibits discharge and refusal to
hire).

Maine

ME. REV. STAT ANN

tit 39-A § 353 (prohibits discrimination in any

manner).
Maryland

Ewingv. Koppers Company, Inc., 312 Md. 45; 537 A.2d 1173 (1988)
(allowing a cause of action based on MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. §
9-1105, which prohibits discharge, based "solely" on employee filing a
claim).

Massachusetts

Ourfalian v. Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 294;
577 N.E.2d 6 (1991) (allowing a cause of action based on MASS. ANN
LAWS. CH. 152 § 75B, which prohibits discharge, discrimination in any
manner or refusal to hire).

Minnesota

Wojciakv. Northern Package Corporation, 310 N.W.2d 675 (1981)
(allowing a cause of action based on MINN. STAT § 176.82, which
prohibits discharge or threatening to discharge).
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Montana

Lueckv. United Parcel Service, 258 Mont. 2; 851 P.2d 1041 (1993)
(allowing a cause of action based on MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-317,
which prohibits termination).

New Jersey

Laity v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668; 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (allowing a
cause of action based on N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-39.1, which prohibits
retaliation).

Ohio

Wilson v. Riverside Hospital, 18 Ohio St. 3d 8; 479 N.E.2d 275 (1985)
(allowing a cause of action based on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90,
which prohibits discharge, demotion, reassignment or any punitive
action).

Oklahoma

Bishop v. Hale-Halsell Company Inc., 1990 OK 95; 800 P.2d 232
(1990) (allowing a cause of action based on OKLA. STAT. tit. 85 § 5,
which prohibits discharge).

Oregon

Brown v. Transcon Lines et al, 284 Ore. 597; 588 P.2d 1087 (1978)
(allowing a cause of action based on OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.043, which
prohibits discharge, discrimination or refusal to hire).

South Dakota

Niesent v. Homestake Mining Company of California, 505 N.W.2d 781
(S.D. 1993) (allowing a cause of action based on S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
62-3-18, which provides that "No contract or agreement, express or
implied, no rule, regulation, or other device, shall in any manner operate
to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by
this title except as herein provided").

Tennessee

Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Company, 677 S.W.2d 441 (1984) ("In this
regard, we agree with Frampton that a retaliatory discharge constitutes a
device under § 50-6-114) (allowing a cause of action based on TENN.
CODE ANN. § 50-6-114, which provides that "No contract or agreement,
written or implied or rule, regulation or other device, shall in any
manner operate to relieve any employer, in whole or in part, of any
obligation").

Texas

Texas Steel Company v. Edward Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (1976)
(allowing a cause of action based on TEX. LAB. CODE § 451.001, which
prohibits discharge or discrimination in any manner).
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Vermont

Murray v. Si Michael's College and Donald Sutton, 164 Vt. 205; 667
A.2d 294 (1995) (allowing a cause of action based on VT. ST AT. ANN. tit.
21 § 710, which prohibits discharge or discrimination).

Virginia

Cooley v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 257 Va. 518; 514 S.E.2d 770 (1999)
(allowing a cause of action based on VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-308, which
prohibits discharge).

Washington

Lins v. Children's Discovery Centers of American, Inc., 95 Wn. App.
486; 972 P.2d 168 (1999) (allowing a cause of action based on WASH.
REV. CODE § 51.48.025, which prohibits discharge or discrimination in
any manner).

West Virginia

Skaggs v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 212 W. VA. 248; 569 S.E.2d
769 (2002) (allowing a cause of action based on W. VA. CODE ANN. § 235A-1, which prohibits discrimination in any manner).

Wyoming

Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 776 P.2d
752 (Wyo. 1989) (allowing a cause of action based on WYO. STAT ANN.
§ 27-14-104(b), which provides that "No contract, rule, regulation or
device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability created by
this act except as otherwise provided by this act").
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AMENDED EXHIBIT C
IN 11 STATES, COURTS CREATED A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE
GENERAL POLICIES IN THE WORKERS9 COMPENSATION STATUTE,
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC ANTI-RETALIATION OR
INTERFERENCE STATUTE
Arizona

Although the Arizona Supreme Court indicated in Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hospital et al, 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985)
(that an at-will employee could bring a wrongful termination in violation
of public policy and that the court itself could determine the public policy
from common law, the Arizona legislature rebuked the court for usurping
its function by enacting ARIZ. REV STAT. § 23-1501 (prohibits retaliatory
termination and provides the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful
termination); Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290; 69
P.3d 1011 (2003) ("The legislature in enacting A.R.S. § 23-1501 took
express exception to the court's indication that it rather than the
legislature had the authority to define public policy").

Colorado

Lathrop v. Entenmann 's Inc., 770 P.2d 1367; 1989 Colo. App. LEXIS 26
(1989).

Illinois

Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111. 2d; 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (creating a
wrongful discharge tort based on "beneficent purpose" of the workers5
compensation law).

Kansas

Murphy v. City ofTopeka-Shawnee County Department of Labor
Services et al, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488; 630 P.2d 186 (1981).

Kentucky

Firestone v. Tom Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (1983) superseded by statute
§ 342.197 (prohibiting discharge, refusal to hire,
harassment, coercion or discrimination in any manner) as recognized in
Overnite Transportation Company v. Michael A. Gaddis, et al, 793
S.W.2d 129 (1990).

KY. REV STAT. ANN.

Michigan

Svento v. The Kroger Company, 69 Mich. App. 644; 245 N.W.2d 151
(1976) (retaliatory discharge contravenes public policy) This state now
has a statute to enforce retaliatory discharge MICK COMP. LAWS § 418.301
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination in any manner).

Nebraska

Jackson v. Morris Communications Corporation, 265 Neb. 423; 657
N.W.2d 634 (2003).
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Nevada

Hansen v. Harrah 's, 100 Nev. 60; 675 P.2d 394 (1984).

New Mexico Michaels v. Anglo America Auto Auctions, Inc., Ill N.M. 91; 869 P.2d
279 (1994) (enforcing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28.2) (prohibiting
discharge, threatening to discharge or retaliating).
North
Dakota

Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home and Rodney Auer, 415 N. W.2d
793 (1987) (allowing a cause of action based on N.D. CENT. CODE § 6501-01, which provides a cause of action based on language in the
workers5 compensation act providing for "sure and certain relief).

Pennsylvania Shickv. Donald L. Shirey T/D/B/A Donald L. Shirey Lumber, 465 Pa.
Super. 667; 691 A.2d511 (1997).
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